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Abstract:
The United States has always claimed to be endowed with unique values, such
as tolerance and justice, and so throughout its history has sought to convey these
values with expressions of patriotism. However, is this patriotism simply symbolic, and
further, does it even lead itself to xenophobia and racism. This thesis seeks to answer
this question by examining the genesis and development of patriotism throughout the
country’s history, as well as the way in which its racism and xenophobia have changed.
Beginning with a general examination of the usefulness and positivity of patriotism from
a scholarly standpoint, the basic points regarding the controversial issue are laid out.
The main ideas of this dispute are provided by noted scholars George Kateb and John
Kleinig in their works Patriotism and Other Mistakes and The Ethics of Patriotism: A
Debate, respectively. Next, using research on history of the United States beginning
from the Revolution, and ending with the Vietnam Era, an extensive picture of these
issues in America develops. This then provides good comparison to the main discussion
of this thesis; the change in patriotism and islamophobia following September 11th, and
how they are connected. This will mainly revolve around the changing relationship that
America had with its Arab and Muslim citizens, as well its changing relationship with the
world. (The former is in many ways a result of the latter). In this more recent era, more
primary sources are to be used, such as One America in the 21st Century: The
President's Initiative on Race, as well as Newspaper articles. The positions of Patriotism
and Islamophobia following soon after 2001 will be the peak of the research and
discussion, as further than this is arguably too recent to garner useful research.
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Throughout this thesis, the various issues with patriotism are explored, as well as
its possibility for usefulness. What is meant to be shown throughout is that patriotism
can and has been used to uphold the positive values of the country, but only when it is
iconoclastic and willing to be admitted as false. When patriotism has been used
symbolically and nationalistically, it has been the cause of extreme racism and
xenophobia, especially in times of crisis such as during World War Two and after
September 11th. In fact, patriotism has been a self fulfilling idea, as it seeks to protect
itself by weeding out dissent. What this all shows is that patriotism is a hard term to get
a clear definition of, but its form in the first decade of the 21st century was very
damaging. It must be made to resemble a purer form of loyalty to the ideal rather than
the symbol to ever be practical again.
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Chapter One:
When discussing patriotism, an important question arises: What exactly is it?
This question has been debated over and again, but patriotism has generally been
described as a loyalty to a land, democratic constitution, history, and cultural identity.
This does not exclusively entail nation states either, as theoretically, patriotism can be to
any territorial social order, from a polis, to a multinational body such as the European
Union.1 This definition is partly what distinguishes patriotism from nationalism. Instead
of a loyalty to a specific ethnic or cultural group, a patriot is loyal to a democratic system
as well as that system’s history. This is where the term patriotism is derived; a devotion
to the patria (fatherland) rather than the ethno-state.2 The loyalties demanded from
patriotism are also widely debated, but generally entail defending the ideals which the
country provides, and further endeavoring to mend the nation rather than expatriating to
another country when it begins to falter in any way. It is important to note how none of
this necessarily entails a passionate love of the country, only a stout resolution to
endeavor for its betterment.3 Additionally, it should be further said that a political system
has forfeited its right to a patriotic citizenry when it delves into tyranny. This
interpretation of patriotism is also quite close to the widely accepted idea of ‘civic
nationalism’ with some even considering the two to be synonymous.4 Additionally, many
definitions of patriotism also describe a transition to a more cosmopolitan, or globalist,
John Kleinig, Simon Keller, and Igor Primoratz. The Ethics of Patriotism: A Debate. Malden,
MA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015, 29.
1
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Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. The Ethics of Patriotism. 20.
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Encyclopedia of Nationalism: Leaders, Movements, and Concepts. Vol. 2. San Diego, CA:
Academic Press, 2001. 407.
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view over time. The ideas described have been largely accepted as the theoretical
example of a perfect patriotism, and clearly distinguish it from nationalism. However,
there are other important factors which define it. In additional to the quasi-Social
Contract aspects of Patriotism, which exist between the citizenry and the state, are
aspects that most scholars consider to be inevitabilities. In the mind of some scholars,
patriotism even becomes an end in and of itself as a byproduct of human nature and
sociability.5 Whether for or against patriotism, most academic research agrees upon the
social certainty of the grouping of peoples into political entities and feeling loyalty
therein. What is not inevitable is the type of grouping which will be formed; a democracy
based on pluralism or an ethno-state. (While ethnic states are not inherently
undemocratic, the nation-states which depended on nationalism in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries stand in stark contrast to the democratic multiethnic states which
claim to demand patriotism in the twentieth and twenty-first century). 6 Additionally, while
many agree on the inevitability of patriotism, they do not agree that it is a positive.
In his scathing but principled castigation of patriotism entitled Patriotism and
Other Mistakes, the political scholar George Kateb describes the various dilemmas
caused by said political loyalty. Start with the simple idea that despite its inevitability,
Kateb argues that intelligent people should know better than to espouse patriotism.7 He
then goes on to describe the varied concerns of, and issues caused by it. Firstly, he
describes the sad loss of personal identity of those who involve themselves in patriotic
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sentiments. In Kateb’s mind, patriotism, like religion and other forms of group thought, is
a simple form of idolatry. He even describes patriotism as arguably being its worst form.
By embracing group love, Kateb argues, we lose all individual identity. He goes on to
say that this form of collective identity is as harmful as being overly self-serving, but that
selfishness at least comes with a shame which prevents one from become too
narcissistic. In his mind, this is a trait which patriotism generally does not have.8 On the
other side, some scholars have come to defend patriotism, tentatively, such as John
Kleinig. Regarding the idea of patriotism as a form of idolatry or narcissistic group-love,
Kleinig argues that we, as humans, are naturally inclined to become overly selfcentered. Because of this, while humans occasionally are unthinking in loyalty, a healthy
loyalty to the place which created us and our identity can in fact be a virtue. The key
caveat here is the term ‘healthy’, as Kleing makes clear that patriots need to remain
cautious as it is often a pitfall of loyalty to blindly praise some false and sterile heroism.
In avoiding this, understanding the bygone, and affirming the liberties entailed in a
democracy, people can engage in a more “mature” construct of patriotism. 9 However,
Kateb would likely disagree with this, as to him, the sanitization of history is simply a
natural and unavoidable aspect of all national loyalty.
In Kateb’s opinion, a country is an abstract entity consisting of only borders and
transmitted memories. Moreover, these memories are often cleansed and purified to fit
a country’s idea of identity. This is in large part the second issue Kateb has with
patriotism; the comfortably clean collective memory. Arguably even more cynical (or
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Kateb. Patriotism and Other Mistakes. 15-16.

9

Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. The Ethics of Patriotism. 39.
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realistic, depending on one’s position) than the idea of a sanitized history is the
argument that the shared memory a nation claims to be commemorating is not even
really its own. Considering that most persons in a country like the United States are not
completely native to it, they should not seek to claim identity with it in this fashion. In this
way, the nation fits in with Kateb’s idea of an abstraction not deserving of loyalty.10
However, the idea of a sanitized history is in direct conflict with Kleinig’s idea of a
‘mature’ patriotism, given that understanding a country’s past and one’s place in it is
vital to representing and fostering a nation’s future. Additionally, Kleinig would likely
further argue that a country is much less of an abstraction than Kateb believes.
Countries can equally be characterized by landmarks, peoples, and laws, as well as its
borders and collective memories. Given all this, is patriotism a blind chauvinism and
vanity? Kleinig argues not, but rather, that pride in a national character absent of ‘we’re
better than you’ narcissism is acceptable and even laudable. Additionally, the universal
values upheld by the nation are nothing to be ashamed of, and keeping them in mind
and memory can even be indispensable.11 However, Kateb would argue that in addition
to being conceited, patriotism can also be immoral and dangerous.
Kateb begins this argument regarding the nefariousness of patriotism by
discussing its effects, but in doing so, he does concedes that it can in fact be used for
good. Applying the example of Abraham Lincoln using patriotic sentiments to rally the
people to defend the nation and end slavery, he says that patriotism can have an
instrumental virtue. However, his caveat to this is that this is all patriotism can be; an
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Kateb. Patriotism and Other Mistakes. 7-8.
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instrument. This means that it is not, and can not be, a good in and of itself. Additionally,
Kateb argues that, more often than not, it is used for much more immoral purposes. In
essence, this implies that fighting for ones country may or may not be moral, but will
always be patriotic.12 Additionally, regarding fighting for countries which happen to be
democratic, he says that a willingness to fight for a democratic country is not the same
as fighting for the principal itself. 13 On the other hand, Kleinig would argue that, in
actuality, the cooperation which patriotism creates is the only reason a democratic
country can flourish and remain so constitutional. In this way, while patriotism can be
used in a corrupting fashion, it is also vital in upholding a country’s positive virtues.
However, he does clarify this with the qualifier that patriotism can be bastardized when
people demonize dissent and claim it is ‘us verses them’. 14 Both scholars also discuss
the main contention of this paper: The alleged inherent jealousy and mistrust which
patriotism sows in citizens regarding persons both internal and abroad.
According to Kateb, patriotism is by its nature an envious form of loyalty, the crux
of his argument essentially being that an ideal patriot desires less patriotism in other
countries. Even in the case of democracies, which many claim to naturally want to work
harmoniously, he believes one nation will seek to prey on another. Additionally, he
argues that democracies often keep domestic liberty at the cost of tyranny abroad, and
demanding patriotism in such a system is both hypocritical and exploitative.15 The
example which comes to mind would be American proclamations of liberty, while using
12

Kateb. Patriotism and Other Mistakes. 12-13.
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products made in sweatshops overseas. He goes on to compare group love of
patriotism to self interest again, saying that both enable immorality, but that the former
was clearly an evil. Kateb’s rationale here is that self-attentiveness and care for close
friends does not demand the same enmity that group-narcissisms like patriotism do.16
Imbedded in this inherent antipathy is an aversion or even hostility to others. This type
of sentiment is not only held by Kateb, as other, more neutral descriptions on patriotism
admit the implied priority of citizens of the nation over non-citizens and foreigners
abroad.17 However, Kleinig would likely counter this with a very simple but quite
effective argument. All of the characteristics described are hallmarks of nationalism
rather than patriotism. In his mind, true democratic loyalty allows for, and accepts the
inevitability of, patriots abroad. In this way, patriotism in the mind of Kleinig is a
perceptive and sympathetic loyalty, while nationalism is the allegiance which declares
only itself to be legitimate.18 Arguably the final issue which Kateb finds with patriotism is
also regarding the enmity inspired by patriotism, only now directed towards the mistrust
it fosters domestically.
For Kateb, as well is being an inherently jealous vice, patriotism is also
distrusting and paranoid. He describes this by discussing the divide which patriotism
fosters in society. This entails the distain for those members of society who do not show
the same levels of flag-waving loyalty. This also means that in order for patriotism to
function, it demands the obedience of all in the society.19 A byproduct of this is the
16
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perpetual need for enemies to root out. This necessity, along with the suspicion of other
nations described previously, are largely the basis upon which people criticize patriotism
and its xenophobic tendencies. However, as with almost all other issues brought up
regarding patriotism, Kleinig has a cautious confidence in and defense of the virtues of
patriotism. Regarding the societal apprehensions caused, he would likely counter with
the idea that theoretically perfect patriotism is not inherently xenophobic, but rather it
fosters genuine conversations about society. His reasoning would be that a perfect
patriot should in fact endeavor to improve his or her nation through protest and
dialogue.20 The ‘egoism and elitism' over those viewed to be ‘unpatriotic’ which Kateb
alleges is unpatriotic itself, even if done by the citizen who waves his flag the most
earnestly. A very simplistic but cogent way to think about this is a topic should be kept in
mind for now. If a person protesting The Vietnam War burned the American flag and
was subsequently called a traitor by his congressman, who is the true patriot? Kateb
would likely argue that it is the congressman, as he is suspicious of the dissent and
wants to root it out, therein lying the malice of patriotism. Kleinig would respond that as
long as his or her intentions were the earnest betterment of America and her actions,
the protestor was. This type of question will become increasingly important when
directly discussing the connection between patriotism and xenophobia more in depth.
From all of these arguments for and against patriotism by scholars, there are few
prominent points. In a wonderfully apropos analogy made by Kateb, he equated the
conspicuous patriotism which people express to being a fan of a sports team. While the
fan can and will actively cheer the team and delight when it does well, a precious few
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are actually part of the team and and benefit from its success. In this way, in cheering
for the team and validating it, the fan is engaging in “willful self-exploitation. 21 Kleing
would likely call this argument cynical, as patriots are, in his mind, very connected to the
actions of the society. More than this, however, he is of the opinion that countries need
something to bind the country together. For this glue to remain benign and not
nationalistic or jingoistic, all citizens must engage in positive, remedial patriotism to the
democratic system.22 This means that blind, flag-waving patriotism without any
connection to ‘liberty and justice for all’ is in fact fraudulent loyalty to a more nationalistic
sentiment. While Kateb would likely call this a naive view, many tend to agree with it. It
is in pursuance of addressing this view that the remainder of this work shall be
dedicated. To this, a preliminary discussion of American patriotism is required, starting
from the very dawn of the United States.
The immediate aftermath of the American Revolution was obviously a very
formative time in the history of the United States, because the actions and celebrations
of the victory would be the genesis of patriotism in the country. The first question to be
asked was; How to appreciate the victory and who could engage in the celebrations?
Almost immediately, as it often is today, liberty and the pulpit were connected. There
was almost instantaneously an evocation of the connection to the church and the new
nation, and nowhere was this more exhorted than in the church itself. In associating
Christianity and Republicanism, priests and ministers were in fact strengthening the
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power and legitimacy of the government.23 Also ingrained in post revolution patriotism,
and again similar to today, was the virtue of military gratitude. In the minds of many
citizens, the gratitude towards those who freed the nation from the yoke of British
tyranny was the type of kindred patriotism that would hold the new states together. By
extension, ingratitude would tear them apart. While on the outset this seems quite
reasonable and even positive, like today, ingratitude or callousness would be seen as
disloyalty.24 Indeed, it can even be alleged that this type of loyalty testing was an effort
by the new states to rout out disloyal citizens, whether intentionally or simply a
serendipitous result. (This will be discussed more later in reference to the loyalist
integration issue). While this is the form it took, patriotism still largely remained an
apparatus of the government.
Strikingly similar to today, patriotism was not just a loyalty in and of itself in the
post-revolution era, but was a device by which people were swayed. Just like many
politicians today use patriotism as flagpole issue they are defending in order to gain
popular support, political figures at the time also used it to further their ideals. Every
political argument, from slavery, federalism verses republicanism, to foreign policy vis-avis the British, had an air of patriotism. Moreover, patriotism was allegedly directly used
by the affluent to command additional control over the citizenry as well. In creating
usable monuments and rallying points, the elites united the people under them and the

Sarah J. Purcell. Sealed with Blood: War, Sacrifice, and Memory in Revolutionary America.
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2002. 50.
23
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Purcell. Sealed with Blood. 67.
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country they controlled.25 It was largely because of all this patriotic sentiment created
around the new country that the Loyalist reintegration issue became so contentious.
One of the more important issues in post-Revolution America, which is often
overlooked in favor of more ‘federalism verses republicanism’ discussions, was the
issue of whether or not to reintegrate those who had remained loyal to the British. The
main reason why new citizens of the United States mistrusted loyalists was because
they fought against everything the new patriotism was formed around. Considering that
post war loyalty to the United States was largely based around gratitude for the people
who ensure the independence of the colonies, how could someone who actively fought
against that independence possibly be patriotic or loyal?26 The substantive goals of
these loyalists did not matter, by dint of being loyalists, they could not be complete
citizens of this new society. This meant former neighbors would forever be treated with
skepticism and mistrust. This issue illustrates the main issue being discussed in the
essay. While not precisely xenophobia, this apprehension of loyalists shows the
inherent mistrust ingrained in patriotism. Also important in the critiques of patriotism is
the allegation that patriots are not truly loyal to the ideals which they claim to be. The
argument revolving around the revolution, and again one which is familiar today, is the
mistreatment of veterans. For a society which claimed to be celebrating and revering
those who fought and died fighting for liberty, they were not treated as such. This is
largely the reason why, only a few years after the revolution, Daniel Shays, a veteran,
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revolted against the society he believed had slighted him.27 This is thus indicative of
another possible problem of patriotism; that it is blind and even a boldfaced lie whose
virtuous facets are hardly ever lived up to. Despite all these issues surrounding it, one of
main sources of patriotic symbolism today is the era of Revolution. The next major
examination of patriotism occurred around 80 years later, during the American Civil War.
The American Civil War saw the rise in what one commenter called “one of the
first ideological armies in history.”28 The reason for this description is that, unlike armed
forces before and after them, both the Union and Confederate forces seemed to know
and believed what they were fighting for. In well published accounts of modern wars,
patriotism has not been a very compelling factor for the fighting men of the United
States. On the other hand, modern research shows that those fighting in the Civil War
carried a patriotic loyalty with them, and which they wore proudly.29 Essentially, the
Yankees were generally fighting to save the republic (except black soldiers fighting for
emancipation), while the Rebs were fighting for independence from a tyrannical rule,
mainly exemplified in the infringing on the right to keep slaves. The pride of the Yankees
is admittedly harder to pin down than the Rebels, as they were generally not fighting for
their homes like their enemies were. Additionally, their commitment to ending slavery
was not as strong as the southerner’s commitment to keeping it. What has become
clearer through research is that the soldiers were generally committed to the patriotic
sentiment of preserving their country. To many, a peace with the South which saw the
27
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country split in half would be an “inglorious and shameful” peace.30 This patriotism was
often even exemplified by the Union Soldiers in the more Kleinig-esque form of a
commitment to liberty, with soldiers holding debates with each other and actively
reading the papers to stay up to date on their country and her wellbeing. While this type
of patriotic belief was more often held by the wealthier officers in the army, the general
commitment to saving the republic was arguably more widespread in the Union army
than the commitment to keeping slavery was in the Confederate.31 This is not to say that
the South did not secede and go to war with the expressed goal of keeping their slaves,
as some contemporaries claimed, only that the patriotism and intentions of common
Confederate soldiers was not as cut and dry as those of their slave-owning officers.
The patriotism of the Confederate soldiers is arguably more interesting to explore
than that of the Union due to how fast it cropped up and the different levels which
soldiers seemed to have. While southerners have always claimed uniqueness from the
rest of the country, the patriotism required during war time had to be drummed up very
quickly. Largely based around militarism, the Confederate States portrayed a war to
escape Yankee tyranny, where it was the South’s God-given mission to save their way
of life. It was also clear that, like during the Revolution, the South’s patriotism was sold
at the pulpit.32 However, it was largely when the Northern armies came to enter
Southern territory that the patriotism of soldiers skyrocketed. Now it truly seemed to
them like a ‘war of Northern Aggression’. In addition to this, however, the war was now
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about protecting their homes. An interesting development of this sentiment was that
many Southern soldiers became disillusioned with their new government when they did
not adequately protect their homes. In fact, this was a large reason for the Confederate
Government to launch the Tennessee Campaign.33 However, this is not to say that no
soldiers believed in the cause, as many did truly surmise that the ‘destiny of the south’
and the causes it represented was worth dying for. Additionally, even more so than in
the North, this sentiment was more prevalent in the officers. While the common soldier
wanted to defend his family, the slave owning officer was much more committed to
fighting to the death, even if it meant never seeing his family again. The connection
between true Confederate patriotism and slave holding is of course strong, as slave
holding rebels were around twice as likely to wholeheartedly support the war.34 To be
clear, racism and a dependence on the status-quo was obviously a factor in the
patriotism of the common Confederate soldier, but to say it was the only factor in his
mind is simply naive. Clearly the motivations and patriotism of non-slaveholding
Confederate soldiers were often quite complicated, with aspects of racism, dependence
on the subjugation and second class status of blacks, Dixie pride, and defense of the
homestead all being factors in their loyalty. However, some claimed it to be so
complicated, with none of the racist leanings being present. Given the rise in
Confederate symbolism and monuments around 1900, many had the public believe that
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the war was only about individual and states rights. 35 Regardless, the Civil War also had
very profound effects on patriotism of the post-war north as well.
As with the Revolution, the immediate post Civil War era was marked by a
celebration and commemoration for those who had died. As early as 1866 a civic
religion was being formed around the martyrs of Abraham Lincoln and the glorious
Union dead. However, this is not to say that these were the only people credited with
the victory. While the celebrations were largely based around military glory and the
triumph of the Republic over those who would divide it, everybody celebrated their own
role. Whether black or white, man or woman, immigrant or native, the people of the
north celebrated their role in the victory.36 However, the celebrations were quickly
becoming more and more divided. As with dispelling the idea that every northerner was
staunchly anti-Slavery, it is also important to make clear that they were not all
desegregationist either. While obviously more so than in the south, the post war
celebrations show how divided the north was as well. While there were some integrated
festivities in the post war-north, many remained segregated. Generally, these
celebrations were also divided on the lines of levity. The integrated celebrations were
generally coordinated by white organizers and contained pomp and frivolity, with the
red, white, and blue being prominent. On the other hand, African-American celebrations
often contained ceremonies and reverence of the Republic and freedom, with more of
air of respect and solemnity for what had been gained.37 This is hardly that surprising,
35
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since blacks had gained arguably the most important and fundamental right of humanity,
while whites had simply retained what they already had. This is not to say that
preserving the republic was not a vital and illustrious goal, only that black Americans
had the heartfelt celebration of freedom as well. However, while black veterans were
initially treated with the respect they deserved, as the years went by, a greater and
greater divide emerged between the memories of the war in the minds of blacks and
whites.
The commemoration of the war was a very important place from which blacks
could show both their commitment to, and how they fought for, the liberty of the Union.
African-Americans intended to show the country that they fought and died for the
republic the same as whites, and were thus committed to keeping the freedom that had
been won.38 This commemoration was perhaps best exemplified in the veterans
organizations which cropped up after the war, none of which were as prominent as the
Grand Army of the Republic (GAR). However, even this organization of brotherhood
showed the cracks between white and black commemoration of the war. While
ostensibly interracial and loyal to the constitution and freedoms granted therein (at least
until the 1870s), the GAR remained de facto segregated in many places. Even worse
than this is the fact that when black only lodges began cropping up, they received a
fraction of the benefits and support of their white counterparts, with many failing.39 While
stories of brotherhood and respect between white and black GAR members remained,
this substantive and effectual segregation showed the deepening divide between white
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and black patriotism and commemorations of the war. The disrespect to black veterans
was even worse. Veterans such as William Carey, first African-American Medal of Honor
recipient, had to keep reminding the people of the United States of what they had fought
for. Unlike many whites, black soldiers were fighting primary for equality. Even when
monuments to black soldiers were erected, such as the ‘Robert Gould Shaw
Monument’, they were 30 years too late and featured a white man most prominently.40
The divide in white and black post civil war patriotism only worsened over time, and by
1900 the Civil War was about largely about Republican reconciliation in the minds of
white Americans, and not slavery. By this time, another test of American patriotism was
about to begin.
Prior to the First World War, German Americans in the Midwest enjoyed a large
amount of security in celebrating their heritage. Germans were well established in
communities, and they were highly engaged in the community, owning businesses and
churches. Their white, Christian values seemingly meshed well with other Americans, as
the hit ‘German Days’ festivals prove. In McLean County, Illinois, said celebration was
enjoyed by both Germans and non-Germans alike, with the colors of the fatherland
adorning flags and buntings across the area.41 While this would change, the coming
resentment of Germans in the Midwest was not immediate. In fact, following the break
out of war in Europe, some local German-American newspapers still had free reign to
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criticize the British leaning consensus of national papers.42 However, when America
entered the War in 1917, this began to change. With America now firmly on the side of
the Entente Powers, the government had free reign to engage in wholehearted patriotic
propaganda. Now America was charged with ‘100 Percent Americanism’, which was
quickly followed by suspicion of German-Americans and legislation. Arguably the most
aggressively anti-dissidence law enacted was the Sedition Act of 1918, which helped to
quell arguments against the war.43 With this governmental pressure, the people of the
midwest quickly began engaging in aggressive patriotism, while at the same time being
fed images and stories of the Rape of Belgium and other German barbarity. Because of
this, midwestern Americans began engaging in ‘patriotic’ flag ceremonies and
xenophobic book burnings. 44 Former neighbors were treated with aggressive suspicion,
such as a demand for church services and newspapers to be in English. The patriotic
sounding rationale here was sadly familiar, with proclamations that ‘the Constitution is in
English, so should your papers’45 sounding like it could either be from 1917 or 2017.
Threats of violence and arson against Churches followed suit, with precious little
condemnation from the government. This virulent anti-foreign, and specifically antiGerman sentiment, insidious in and of itself, then fed into the post-war witch hunting of
the First Red Scare.
America during and following the First World was beginning to reassess what
freedom of speech meant. Perhaps, in the minds of some, unfiltered free speech was
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not exactly what the founders had intended, and loyalty may be a more important virtue
to uphold. Because of this reassessment, aliens and the lower class largely became
equated with radicals in the emergence of middle-class anxiety induced nativism.46 The
reason for this emergence was a mix of residual distrust of foreign sabotage from the
War and the new fear of Bolshevism in the United States. Using new tactics and tools
such as the Espionage Act, the government could now freely attack what it believed to
be disloyal elements of the country, the main targets being labor and aliens. Moreover,
these two groups were not attacked independently. This ‘defense of American Liberty’
ironically allowed for such gross attacks on that same liberty, such as the Palmer Raids.
Ironically, Alexander Palmer actually started as a champion of the underdog. What
pushed him to violate the rights of so many Americans was predominantly a recognition
of the fears of the public and that they could be manipulated. By attaching himself to the
patriotically wary sentiments of the common American and then further fanning the
public’s xenophobia, Palmer believed he could win the presidency.47 The main
conclusion regarding patriotism and xenophobia to be drawn from both the First World
War and the First Red Scare are quite simple, if a bit disheartening. During crises, there
are no real guarantees against government infringement of liberties unless resisted by
the people. This means that, essentially, the burden of guilt is partially on the citizens
when liberties are taken away, because ignoring xenophobic and nationalistic sentiment
is a crime of inaction. Second, and connected with the first, if the citizen is not careful,
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the natural patriotism which emerges during wartime can quickly develop itself into a
tool to take the very liberties it claims to protect.48 It appears that, even if there was
pushback against the First Red Scare, the American People did not learn their lesson,
as the fundamental liberties of countless Americans were again stolen during the
Second World War.
The internment of Japanese Americans was probably the most blatant
infringement of American Liberties in history. What is interesting about the internment,
however, is that it was not actually a very popular option immediately following Pearl
Harbor. The normally unrestrained J. Edgar Hoover found that the link between
Japanese-Americans and terrorism was limited, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was quick to
say that these people were more at risk of white-Americans than the other way around,
military leaders such as John DeWitt expressed their skepticism, and Congress was
quite restrained in attempting to pass restrictive legislation. 49 What began to change the
opinions of the government was heavy lobbying by anti-Japanese Groups such as the
‘West Coast Coalition’ (WCC). The WCC was a flagrantly racist organization, often
advocating for keeping the Japanese out even after the war ended. The only thing the
war changed with regard to the WCC and their policies was that they had free reign to
express their views. Now, it was patriotic to try to protect the country from the
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Japanese.50 It was largely because of this lobbying that the government and military
made the switch to supporting internment.
When Executive Order 9066 was enacted, it was ostensibly race neural, with
Italians and Germans as possible targets, as well as the Japanese. However, the order
quickly came to affect the Japanese solely, mainly because there was little support for
the internment of the other two ethnic groups. The main reason for this was that the
Italians and Germans were already assimilated and were not perceived to pose a
threat.51 However, this is not true. Firstly, even though the Germans and Italians were in
some ways more assimilated, this did not mean they posed a lesser threat than the
Japanese. In reality, no group posed a threat to America, but only the Japanese were
weak enough in the United States that they could be bullied. Second, the threat of
invasion from the Atlantic was in fact more possible than the Pacific, with actual fighting
on and off the east coast much more possible. 52 While in some ways internment seems
to resemble other crisis era actions, it should be noted that, despite what some
revisionist historians claim, internment was not a natural extension of prewar
suspicions. Rather, people with ulterior motives used an air of patriotism to exploit the
crisis of World War Two to enact their racist policies.53 (Whether this happens in other
times such as today will be explored in subsequent chapters). During the next era in
which American Patriotism was questioned, the Civil Rights Movement, the exploitation
of crisis largely did not work and the movement was successful.
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Despite what many people of the time alleged, the Civil Rights Movement was
arguably one of the most patriotic crusade’s in American History. In arguably his most
famous speech, where he describes his dream for America, Martin Luther King Jr.
evokes countless patriotic conceptions and symbolism. He goes on to describe the
promise of the Revolution and the Civil War and the liberties therein. 54 His evocation of
the founding fathers begs the question: Even if the founding fathers did not, are
Americans patriotic enough to live up to the Constitutional principals of liberty, justice,
and freedom?55 Exactly opposite to the positive idea of patriotism evoked by MLK,
whites across the country believed the ideals of America and the founding fathers to be
on the side of segregation. In an incredibly sad but poignant example of this, at the
funeral of sometimes overlooked Civil Rights leader Medgar Evers, police officers took
the American flags away from black mourners.56 In a much more political fashion than
this type of heartbreaking racism, many also questioned the loyalty of black leaders visa-vis communism. The patriotism and loyalty of civil rights leaders was often challenged,
with some going so far as to claim that their boldness showed that they were agents of
the Soviet Union. Said civil rights leadership responded in arguably the most patriotic
way; by stating that to win the Cold War and defend liberty, America must end
segregation.57 Many soon began to view the Civil Rights Leadership as new founding
fathers, which begs an important question in pursuant to the previous one: If civil rights
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leaders follow the words and ideals of the founding fathers, but pro segregationists
follow the actual actions they took, who are the true patriots? In the minds of the civil
rights leaders, in order live up to patriotism and the ideals of America, her citizens must
charge themselves with enforcing equality.58 The change that these leaders demanded
was also shared by others not directly connected to the civil rights movement, but
rather, the counterculture movement.
While the idea of the counterculture movement as a patriotic crusade may not
seem very consequential, the question certainly deserves attention. Despite
counterculture today being largely relegated to pop culture, there used to be a true
rebellious and free spirit involved in it. With protesters and icons like Bob Dylan gaining
much of their energy and methods from the Civil Rights movement, it is no wonder that
it contained an air of patriotism, even if it did not always seem to do so.59 The two main
movements I wish to discuss are the East coast oriented Youth International Party
(Yippies), and the San Fransisco based hippie movements. The former, the Yippies,
were the more protest oriented. Arguably their most prominent protest was at the 1968
Democratic National Convention in Chicago. The unrest, like the Civil Rights Movement
before it, asked the question: Who were the patriots, the protesters who had previously
desecrated the American flag60 or the Chicago police and Mayor Richard J. Daley who
opposed them?61 The movement on the West Coast was markedly more calm.
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Exemplified by the experimentation with drugs such as LSD, the Grateful Dead, free
love, and anti-bureaucracy, the west coast movement was much less a protest
movement than an expression of freedom. In fact, after a noted activist became political
at a Dead concert, Jerry Garcia expressed resentment, as the concert was not really
meant to be overtly political.62 However, mainstream Americans still expressed disgust
with the laziness of these young people who were apparently wasting the privilege they
had been afforded and which previous generations did not have.63 Again, who are the
patriots; the people trying to simply live life without politics, or those standing up for
‘traditional American values’? Over time, generally, the traditional conservatism won out,
and even got carried away in the following decades.
Right wing nationalistic movements in the United States were, in large part, both
the culmination of years of conservatism and a response to liberal events such as the
Civil Rights Movement. However, this is not very unique, as it is how most nationalistic
movements form, including the Black Nationalism Movement in the United States (only
this movement was responding to a rise in conservatism).64 One of the first prominent
far-Right conservative groups emerging in the late 1950s was the John Birch Society
(JBS). While not overtly nationalistic, its existence arguably allowed for nationalistic
groups to emerge. The stated goal of the JBS was to counter communism and labor,
and to do this, they directly attacked Civil Rights leaders including MLK. To the JBS,
Communism and Civil Rights were connected, with Communist agitation being the
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primary motivator of the marches. However, the idea of a connection was not even
solely confined to the far-Right either, as by 1965, a majority of the county believed
there to be at least some kind of connection. This was largely the reason why one could
often see signs such as “Support your local police”, because not doing so meant helping
communists.65 (This particular signage is vert similar to sentiments in modern America).
The next groups to emerge were overtly nationalistic; Robert DuPugh and the
Minutemen organization and its branch, William Potter Gale and the United States
Christian Posse (USCP). While the former was an blatantly far-right paramilitary group,
it was the latter which truly began to wholeheartedly delve into racism and antiSemitism. With overlapping membership with the Ku Klux Klan, the USCP was
concerned with gun rights, states rights, and white supremacy.66 These far right groups
claimed to be patriots defending Christian-American values against Civil Rights
Leadership and ‘Jewish plots.’67 This type of abhorrent ‘patriotism’ is unfortunately still in
existence today, and arguably was the motivations behind monstrous acts from
personal hate-crimes all the way to the Oklahoma City Bombing. These peoples’ views
were mainly a response to an increasing multiculturalism in the United States brought
upon by increased immigration.
Despite what the values of the United States have been stated to be in the
constitution, and despite what some modern politicians will claim, America has never
been as inclusive as it has claimed, and this is especially true towards immigrants. One
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only need look at the Know-Nothing Party, the Chinese Exclusion Act, and the Second
KKK to see this.68 It is important to note that, despite occasional serious and virulent
xenophobia against white immigrants, there was still always a white verses non-white
flavor to this. The implication here is that, while white immigrants have faced horrible
persecution, as will be discussed in this section, they always were eventually able to
merge with the accepted white-American spectrum. This was because poor white
immigrants could identify more readily with elites, because they could be more easily
assimilated by elite whites given their overt similarities, and because blacks had been
persecuted for so long that racism against them had become ingrained in American
society. Nativism in the United States was also always as much about poverty as it was
about ethnicity. Two of the major immigration movements in the United States following
the Civil War were between 1880 and 1924, and 1970 and 1998.69 The first era saw a
shift to Eastern and Southern European Immigrants, while the second, later era, saw a
change to Central and South America, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia.
Unsurprisingly, the main similarity between these two eras of mass immigration to
the United Staes, unsurprisingly, is that both eras contain an air of nativism and even
white supremacy. Essentially, in each era, an immigrant could not wave the flag of his or
her old nation. There are, however, many other similarities in the eras. Firstly, both saw
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a massive change in the area of origin for the new immigrants. This means that it was
both alarming to the existing population and harder to assimilate for the immigrants.
This means that it is easier for the existing Americans to form a xenophobic identity, as
new immigrants are seen as very different. While some in both eras blatantly espoused
racism, challenging the intelligence and charging the new immigrants with vulgarity,
others claimed economic degradation as their reasoning. (This was largely done in
order to avoid the often taboo race issue).70 Another similarity is, sadly, the violence
immigrants faced in both eras. While the era between 1880 and 1920 saw massive
lynch mobs and labor movements mobilized around violence towards immigrants, the
era between 1970-1998 saw more personal, but often more violent and disturbing, hate
crimes.71 The point here is that while the groups of immigrants faced somewhat different
forms of violence, they both faced it in spades.
The latter had an exorbitant larger number of illegal immigrants than the former.
During the earlier era, the main illegal immigration was the ‘white slavery’ trade in
Eastern European women.72 In the later period, large numbers of Central Americans
and East Asians entered the country illegally. While not actually changing the
immigrants themselves, this vastly changes the arguments many make. A second
difference is that the earlier group of immigrants faced discrimination that was
enforceable by law. This entailed, among other things, literacy tests in voting and quotas
in both schools and employment. This is not to say that immigrants in the latter era did
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not face legal discrimination, only that it was much more subtle, as unconcealed racial
laws had largely become illegal by this point.73 The final difference is the position of the
United States in the world, as both a goal for immigrants and as a more inviting society.
While the era after the Civil War and before the First World War saw a large influx of
immigrants, this was largely because of the insular prosperity of the country. In fact,
much of this period was marked by heavy isolationism. On the other hand the period
between 1945 and 2000 saw the United States emerge as a much more global power.
This globalism largely fostered immigration.74 Given all of these differences, one may
think that the nativism fostered in the two eras is dissimilar, but the same xenophobic
concerns have come up time and time again in American history.
Nativism in both eras of mass immigration into the United States was fostered by
the same quasi-patriotic misgivings. The first concern was based around political
concerns. Essentially, nativist Americans believe that aliens were subversive. While this
was first alluded to when the First Red Scare was discussed above, it has been much
more far-reaching than that. In the earlier era of immigration, almost every group was
connected to some form of conspiracy, no matter how convoluted. To many Americans,
the Germans were spies of the Kaiser, Catholics were subversives of the pope, Italians
were anarchists and criminals, and Jews were Bolsheviks. In the more modern era, this
trend continued, with many equating Asians, Central Americans, and South Americans
as contributing to the drug and criminality problem. There were even rumors that
Mexican Immigrants were planting themselves in the Southwest in order to take it back
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from the United States.75 Another point that many made (more in the earlier era), was
that these immigrants could not contribute to a democratic society, given that they were
ruled by kings in Europe and are not accustomed to liberty.76 Interestingly, there is a
similar argument made about Muslim Immigrants today. Other nativist arguments
revolved around economic issues. In both eras, people blamed immigrants for taking
their jobs or lowering their wages. Both eras of nativists claimed that Immigrants would
inevitably become economically dependent on the government. In the early era, this
constituted entering poor houses and becoming public charges.

In the later era it

entailed allegations that immigrants inevitably file for welfare.77 However, these
economic arguments are usually easily countered, as many studies have shown mass
immigration to be good for society. An interesting economic argument that has only
cropped up in the later era of immigration is the ownership of businesses by immigrants
in minority neighborhoods. These immigrants, often Korean, Indian, or Arab are
frequently resented by the residents because they are not seen as giving back to the
community.78 As is clear, each of these nativist ideals, in some way draws from the
patriotic concept of upholding democracy, rights, and freedom and defending ones
fellow citizens. However, there are much more indefensibly xenophobic arguments
based around the ‘social decimation’ of the United States.
In both eras of mass immigration to the United States, there have been some
nativist arguments that revolve around perceived social issues caused by immigrants.
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These arguments mainly revolved around the idea that they will eventually fracture
America. These arguments always involve the conception that immigrants do not
assimilate in American culture, and will eventually ruin it. This revolves around the
differences in the cultures, ideals, and languages of the immigrants. While some like
Teddy Roosevelt believed that Americanization of the immigrants could and should
occur, others could not fathom this.79 They even more thoroughly reject the idea of a
multicultural America. This is why nativists and xenophobes of the early and late eras
rejected the cultures of Eastern and Southern Europeans Immigrants, and South
American and Asian Immigrants, respectively. An ironic point they make is that these
new groups do not share the same history, and cannot appreciate what it means to be
an Americans.80 What is ironic about this is that many of those bemoaning new
immigrants is that they are almost always descended from other immigrants, and thus
cannot possibly claim American history if they disallow the new people to do so. What is
sadly true about both these eras is, while there was certainly nativism during them, they
also sparked massive increases in xenophobia in the years following. This idea implies
that the era between 1998 and today has been increasingly nativist. The remainder of
this essay will address this thesis.
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Chapter Two:
During the period between the Vietnam War and September 11th, 2001, the
United States went through a few very important evolutions based upon conceptions of
patriotism and xenophobia, which shaped its perspectives and actions in foreign and
domestic policy. These positions formed the basis from which the United States
attempted to grasp such a monumental tragedy 9/11. It is generally agreed that the
Vietnam War challenged American ideas of exceptionalism and patriotism. While this is
largely clear in the broad sense of the whole American zeitgeist, it should be clarified
that the attitudes of common citizens were more complex. Regardless, the habitual and
institutionalized rise of anti-patriotic attitudes, real or imagined, brought about a certain
reckoning from the political Right, largely in the form of hawkish foreign policy,
neoConservatism, and a return to traditional American values.
Responding to the much maligned ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ and apparent hedonism
of the 1960s, the conservatives reasserted American Exceptionalism both abroad and
domestically, best exemplified by the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George H.W.
Bush. The post-Cold War Era and Bill Clinton’s presidency were in many ways a
response to these trends in turn. His presidency saw a rise in more ethical and
intentional foreign intervention and an ethnic makeup that was edging towards healthy
diversity. In these ways, the post-Vietnam War era saw the eventual development of a
largely purposeful patriotism where America’s foreign policy was more careful and
meaningful, and its domestic policy was inclining towards a multicultural state. However,
these trends were largely bucked as a result of September 11th.
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There is a generally accepted narrative that the United States during the Vietnam
War became very unpatriotic. While this was in many ways the case, as with other ideas
about history, this was not the only scenario. The accepted narrative is that the youth of
America were divided in two, with some going off to fight, and others refusing. The latter
in this scenario have been, and often still are, viewed later on as cowards, spoiled, and
subversive to the war effort and America.81 However, this was not the case. While
Vietnam was certainly a war fought by the poor American man (lower income Americans
were twice as likely to die in the war than even middle class men),82 this is not to say
that all middle and upper class young people avoided the war out of resentment for their
country. While the anti-war movement was certainly led by the American youth including
college students, many young people had no ill will towards the United States. Many
middle class kids were actively patriotic and feared the communists like all ‘good’
Americans were suppose to be. However, this did not mean that they wanted to fight
and die half-way across the world.83 Additionally, many simply did not understand the
War enough to be truly upset by it, leading to a resentment towards those protesting it
so vigorously. These young people, combined with those who enjoyed counterculture
but were apolitical, show that the Vietnam War narrative is much more complex than
simply soldiers and unpatriotic subversives who hated the United States and were
actively degrading it. 84 While the United States was arguably torn asunder in many
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ways, it should not be conceded that those who did not support the war hated America,
God, or Capitalism, as many revisionists often claim. Regardless, ‘Vietnam Syndrome’
was being rallied against by conservatives.
The term ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ refers to the the allegation by conservatives that,
after the War, the political left were unpatriotic and were restraining the country from
exerting its might abroad. While used in a pejorative sense by the political right, it may
not have been such a bad development. Hereafter, when ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ is
referred to, it will be referring to the more conscious patriotism following such a
controversial conflict rather than the conservative insult it is implied to be. The reason
this term entered the lexicon was that Vietnam, unlike any conflict since the Civil War,
split the country.85 (This does not contradict the previous paragraph, as, again, many on
both sides were patriotic). In demanding an end to the war no matter the consequences,
the American people damaged the pride and exceptionalism which had been building
since the Second World War. This, in addition to the reckoning of Watergate, forced the
United States to discuss national interests and actions in a different way.86 While this
was seen by many as defeatist, it was simply more cautious and pragmatic. While this
was plausibly a positive and maturing development for the country, the conservatives
did not see it this way, leading to decades of Republican exceptionalism. This is where
American patriotism was after Vietnam: either judicious or neutered, depending on who
one asked.
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The patriotic sentiment of the United States, which lent itself to a willingness to
assert the benefits of the democracy and capitalism abroad, was largely depleted after
the Vietnam War. A quintessential example of this was the refusal to use
military force during the Angolan Civil War under Gerald Ford. When the President
contemplated intervention, Congress quickly denied him the possibility.87 Up until the
late 1980s, Democrats rejected intervention into countries which even resembled
Vietnam. They viewed any such attack as both immoral and unnecessary. This type of
of military hesitation is largely what made the Republicans invent the term ‘Vietnam
Syndrome’. They viewed the flinching as risking a concession of the Cold War, loss of
Superpower status, degrading of patriotism, and forfeiture of world leadership. This idea
brought about vast historic revisionism of the War and the presumption that the United
States was infallible, but merely handicapped by the unpatriotic.88 This concept was part
of the core rhetoric of Ronald Reagan.
Upon joining the Republican Party, Ronald Reagan became a standard bearer
for American Conservatism. His right leaning rhetoric can be traced as far back as the
1960s, and more specifically, during the 1964 Presidential Election when he made his
famous ‘A Time for Choosing’ speech in favor of candidate Barry Goldwater. In it, he
rallied against what he saw as the most prominent issues facing the United States;
mainly Communists, elites, and Lyndon Johnson’s ‘great society’.89 His speech
contained the patriotic hyperbole which defined Reagan’s career, including his
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subsequent governorship and 1976 Presidential Run. In fact, one can see a
development of further patriotic, jingoistic even, rhetoric. In his governorship between
1967 to 1975, Reagan championed against the lawlessness he saw in protests, at one
point even threatening to criminalize them. In his view, the unpatriotic protesters had
emboldened the Vietcong to continue the war against the United States.90 During his
failed 1976 Presidential run, Reagan continued this patriotic platform. Essentially, his
campaign was run on a promise to end détente with the Soviet Union, which he was
known for in retrospect.91 In this way, Reagan was reasserting American patriotism
before he was even in the highest office in the land.
By his second run for president, Reagan had fully formed his practically
nationalistic platform. By the 1980 Republican National Convention, he was arguing that
virtually all of America’s issues could be traced back to the liberalism and disloyalty of
the 1960s. Despite losing her way, he was of the opinion that The United States could
reassert her power and spirit abroad. Essentially, this was his main appeal as a
candidate and first term President. Optimism and exceptionalism would purge the
weakness and self doubt which he believed so embodied the 1960s.92 In his mind,
America was entering an era of renewal. By his second term, it was his goal to make
the people believed their country to be prouder and stronger than ever, with renewed
military purpose and patriotism. This idea was embodied so enticingly by the slogan, ‘Its
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Morning in America, Again’.93 While this certainly appears to be a constructive goal, it
had its chauvinistic and bellicose side in practice.
The issues with Reagan Era Patriotism are mainly regarding the refusal to admit
the mistakes of the country in the past, and the denial of any legitimacy of any regime’s
claim to challenge the United States in the present or future. As argued above, the
efforts of Reagan and other conservatives to distance America from the ‘mistakes’ of
Vietnam era disloyalty led to severe revisionism of the era. The claims made ranged
from saying there were no American War Crimes, to the argument that the war could
have been won if the armed forces had been mobilized totally, early. Additionally, and
more dangerously for the future of protesting other government actions, some claimed
that it was a hostile media and anti-war movements which had lost the war for
America.94 In using undeniably patriotic rhetoric to attack free press and protesters,
Reagan and the other conservatives set a very dangerous precedent for the future of
this fourth estate. Unfortunately, many have adopted this tactic for use today as well.
The other danger of Reagan Era Patriotism was the gung-ho attitude towards opposing
those regimes which disagreed with the United States or apposed it ideologically.
In a post-Vietnam War Era world, resisting the democratic, capitalist system must
have appeared attractive to many nations of the world. Reagan sought to put an end to
this by employing patriotism. An ardent and steadfast patriot himself, he strove to
increase the arms budget in a massive way, aid all anti communists, and end détente
with Russia (as he promised in his campaign). While the latter of these goals arguably

93

Bothmer, “Blaming ‘the Sixties’,” in Framing the Sixties, 37.

94

Herring, “The Vietnam Syndrome,” in The Columbia History of the Vietnam War, 413.

40

did produce dividends in contributing to the fall of the Soviet Union, the former goals
were more controversial, and at times, illegal. These were embodied by an attempt to
increase nuclear forces in Europe, despite NATO not being entirely permissive, and
increased aid to anti-communist insurgents, most notably to the Contra Rebels in
Nicaragua.95 Essentially, much of Reagan’s patriotism revolved around justifying military
action designed to disrupt the spread communism and, more importantly, ending the
dreaded ‘Vietnam Syndrome’. During his presidency, this was also seen in the support
of the El Salvadorian Government in fighting Communist guerrillas during the El
Salvadorian Civil War and the Invasion of Grenada in 1983. 96 Despite his actions,
American patriotism had not yet reached pre-Vietnam magnitudes quite yet. For many,
the war was still fresh in their minds and they were not ready to wave the flag so whole
heartedly. This, in addition to the Iran-Contra Scandal and the tragic bombing of the
Marine Corps Base in Beirut, Lebanon, meant that the American people were still sick
with the unpatriotic ‘Vietnam Syndrome’.97 It became the task of George H.W. Bush to
finally end this ailment.
Like his predecessor, Reagan, Bush Sr. sought to fully reinvigorate American
Patriotism through militarism, and his biggest action therein was Dessert Storm. What
separated Bush Sr.’s militarism from Reagan's was what would become know as the
‘Powell Doctrine’, named for then-General Colin Powell. Essentially this ideology was
based around the ideas of full military force, only used as a last resort, and only if the
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public supported it.98 In this way, Bush Sr. waged a war on the Persian Gulf much
different than Reagan ever did in any of the conflicts during his Presidency. It was the
goal of Bush Sr. to ensure the American people knew that a Vietnam-esqe quagmire
could be avoided, and thus stopped short of entering Baghdad to overthrow Saddam
Hussain or of supporting Shiite Militants. In doing this, it was claimed that ‘Vietnam
Syndrome’ was “buried in the Arabian dessert”.99 Despite this claim was likely a bit
premature (the American people continued worrying about intervention all throughout
the 1990s), Bush Sr. and the immensely successful campaign led by General
Schwarzkopf went a long way in reasserting patriotism as an important factor in
American life. This type of red-white-and-blue rhetoric was also a main factor in
domestic issues during the period of Bush Sr.’s presidency.
Even before the Persian Gulf War, Bush Sr. was using Patriotism to drum up
support for himself. During the election of 1988, he was accusing his opponent,
Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis, of being unpatriotic. His claims to this were
based around the facts that Dukakis was a member of the American Civil Liberties
Union and that his wife, Kitty, was previously an ardent protester, possibly even a flag
burner.100 In addition to attacking his opponent’s patriotic legitimacy, Bush Sr. promoted
his own. He did this by building up issues such as the necessity for the pledge of
allegiance in schools and criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision that flag burning was
legal, then claiming that in supporting the former and decrying the latter, he was the only
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true patriot and viable candidate.101 Whether this was scrupulous or not is somewhat
irrelevant. By using this patriotic rhetoric, Bush was able to catapult himself to office.
This showed that issues revolving around patriotic loyalty were viable issues to exploit
in politics. 102 Interestingly, in a report four years after the 1988 Election, some
commentators still did not view the use of patriotism in politics as an issue.
The report entitled “Patriotism, Politics, and the Presidential Election of 1988”, by
John L. Sullivan, Amy Fired, and Mary G. Dietz, cited multiple times above, is very
useful in exploring the use of patriotism in a political way by George H.W. Bush.
Essentially, they conclude the piece by discussing the fact that, given the precedent set
by such politicians as Reagan and Bush Sr. in the Elections of 1984 and 1988,
respectively, politicians knew how to use patriotism as a tool to win elections. In the
words of the writers, said patriotism became a “symbolic cloak…in which political
leaders seek to wrap themselves.”103 They continue to argue that this use of patriotic
rhetoric is in fact a bastardization of the traditional rebellious meaning of the term.
Essentially, given that patriotism embodied rebellion against a tyrannical crown in
England, it is misused in promoting conformity.104 However, the essay ended on a
somewhat optimistic note, with the authors believing politics had not yet become so
adulterated to be a major issue problem. In their words, patriotism and actions
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committed in the name of it was not yet “soundbite politics.”105 This does beg the
question of whether or not it became so in the subsequent years. The decade which
ushered in the end of the Cold War provides very interesting examples on this question,
and perhaps ushers in an era where patriotism is ‘soundbite politics’.
After the end of the Cold War, America had to find a new direction with which to
mobilize patriotism. Without the Soviet Union as the enemy of liberty, a new type of
patriotic jingoism gradually emerged in the 1990s: Militaristic exportation of
humanitarianism. The main evolutions of this occurred in Somalia and Bosnia. The
Somali conflict was an event which triggered a major development for the United States.
After the Battle of Mogadishu, the people of the United States realized a few important
facts: Firstly, that they could no longer afford to underestimate local nationalism, and
second, that the United States could no longer serve as world police.106 These
realizations came from the anti-interventionism of the American people; arguably a
resurgence of Vietnam Syndrome. This non-aggressive nature then leant itself to the
American views on the Bosnian Conflict. Because of the evening news, people saw the
tragic conflict happening in real time, such as the abhorrent Srebrenica Massacre, but
because of the non-interventionism, they would not accept large scale conflict.107 In an
attempt to keep his distance to a degree, Bill Clinton only sanctioned air strikes. While
this arguably led to a positive outcome, it can be argued that America ignored a different
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tragedy in an effort to remain anti-interventionist: The Rwandan Genocide. 108
Essentially, this type of humanitarian militarism is what American patriotism had become
before 2001.
Interestingly, the desire to export American patriotic values changed political
sides during Bill Clinton’s presidency. Between Vietnam and the mid 1990s, it had
mainly been the conservatives who had been attempting to spread capitalism and
democracy abroad. However, during Clinton’s presidency, it was mainly the democrats
who sought to spread justice across the world and stop tragedy.109 While these are
different exports, they represent perceived American values. Arguably the most
important example of this was the NATO intervention into the Kosovo War in 1999,
given how close in time it was to September 11th. Essentially, in order to prevent
genocide, NATO Forces led by The United States jumped into action, but in order to
prevent quagmire, halted the intervention to airstrikes. In this way, the military actions by
the United States in the late 1990s led to much more shrewd American intervention,
with patriotism permitted for only humanitarian intervention, but still limited in order to
avoid lengthy entanglement.110 Arguably, this is a much smarter form of foreign policy
based patriotism. Although it had its issues such as the hesitation to intervene in
Rwanda, it conceivably made the United States a much more judicious world leader.
However, this was not to be, since September 11th allowed for the more conservative
patriotism to thrive. Now Islam was the main adversary of traditional American values,
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rather than communism, as it had been previously. However, it can not be thought that
only patriotism went through modifications between the Vietnam War and the 1990s, as
ideas of race, nationalism, and social non-conformity did as well.
Like patriotism, the ethnic and social landscapes of America went through
important changes between the 1960s and 2001, which decided how groups such as
Arab Americans were viewed in the Twenty-first century. It is no big secret that the
1960s saw a rise in permissiveness and liberalism which later provoked a backlash from
conservatives. What was less clear, but equally true, was that this backlash was forming
very quickly even as early as the late 1960s, again signaled by the ascendancy of
political leadership such as Ronald Reagan.111 While the rise in neoconservatism was of
course characterized by hawkish foreign policy—as mentioned above—it was also
typified by a charge against social liberalism. Again, this is no big secret, but the rise in
traditional values is essential in explaining America’s relationship with race, and
specifically with Arab-Americans in the twenty-first century. Politically skilled politicians
like Reagan blamed social policies for all of the United States ills. While this worked in
some senses in reinvigorating American confidence, it also divided the country along
easily discernible racial, social and political lines which came to depend largely on one’s
perception of ‘American values’. Arab and Muslim Americans were no exceptions to this,
and their ideas of loyalty needed to be formed around the values idealized after the
1960s
In an effort to promise a return to order, neoconservatives rallied against
President Johnson and capitalized on the apprehensions forming around the 1960s.
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Attacking ‘welfare queens’ and protesters, there were clear arguments based around
‘traditional American values’; aid values being economic self reliance and unquestioning
support for American actions.112 A main issue with these arguments was that they
implied that all those who relied on more government assistance and who were
unsupportive of American foreign actions were un-American. This meant that clear
‘American verses un-American’ social and ethnic lines were formed, which have lasted
up to the modern day. These lines were especially exacerbated by the established
political order leaning more Republican after Johnson.113 This type of American
traditionalism continued up to the Reagan era, with the 1960s being blamed for all
American problems.
With a rise in crime, hard drug use, and a decline in education, morality, and
discipline perceived by conservatives in the 1980s, there must have been a reason.
Believing that the social and political permissiveness of the 1960s was to blame for all
these issues, Reagan argued that the decade of hedonism had devastated traditional
Americanism.114 With campaigns such as ‘Just Say No’ under his wife Nancy, the
Reagan Administration appealed to the conservative nature of many citizens while
ostracizing those who did drugs as inherently wrong and immoral. In addition to this,
Reagan sought to crackdown on crime and limit social freedoms. With his nomination of
the heavily conservative Robert Bork to the Supreme Court in 1987, he showed his
intention to reestablish what he believed to be social order and traditional
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Americanism.115 During the same time, Reagan attempted to reestablish the role of
religion in America.
Believing a permissive society was destroying America, Reagan championed
reestablishing the rule of a few ‘basic truths’ that were being ignored. Seeing chaotic
liberalism as the reason for problems in America ranging from laziness to the HIV crisis,
he wanted to reassert American moral superiority.116 The issues with this are varied, but
essential in understanding the country’s contemporary racial and social issues, as well
as its equation of Christianity with patriotism. Firstly, in describing homosexuals and
drug addicts as inherently immoral, they become pariahs who did not represent
America, but in fact degraded it.117 The former is inherently tied to race as well, as it is
mainly poorer minorities who are victims of drug epidemics, such as during the crack
epidemic.118 This set a dangerous precedent in differentiating races by morality, whether
intentionally or as a product of systemic crackdowns on issues such as drug use.
Additionally, the description of LGBTQ liberation as immoral brings up the other ‘basic
truth’ which Regan wanted to reestablish; Christianity as the fundamental standardbearer for moral America. In equating Christianity with ethics, and then ethics with
politics and social order, religion became a major factor in being an upstanding citizen of
the United States.119 While Christianity has long been a factor in defining America,
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revising steps made in the previous decades towards religious cohesion certainly had a
negative impact on the United States, which continued through the twenty-first century.
This all had ramifications in the post September 11th era, where traditional values made
a resurgence based around the ideals formed under Reagan, which then went on to
define the lives of many Arab and Muslim Americans. What is interesting, however, is
that despite many of these issues reemerging in the 2000s as hallmarks of
conservatism, America saw the arguable development of a positive and healthy postnationalism in the 1990s.
In 1997, Bill Clinton commissioned the report entitled “One America in the 21st
Century: The President's Initiative on Race”, which provides vital information in
assessing the situation of race in America just prior to 2001. Very established racial
historians and professors took part in writing the report and painted a very honest and
somewhat optimistic picture for the future of America. A discussion of this report is
incredibly important as it shows what the American racial landscape was like just prior to
2001, and how America would have been a very different country in terms of race
relations had 9/11 not occurred.
First contained in Clinton’s initiative on race is a discussion of white verses
minority opinions on racial questions facing the nation. The authors wrote that,
essentially, white Americans have very different, often dated, views as compared to
other ethnic groups. For many caucasian Americans, their assimilation had occurred
generations ago, so their views were out of touch with modern society, specifically the
fact that ethnic distributions were changing. This is evidenced by the fact that it was
mainly people of color who used the government more instrumentally in addressing
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discrimination.120 This points to a general trend among white Americans; not active
racism, but complacency and ignorance. In the report, studies showed that only 36
percent of caucasian Americans believed that there were still issues with race in
America in 1997. 121 What is contemporarily called ‘white privilege’ was then described
as an ignorance of the subtle racism that occurs systematically on a daily basis. What is
interesting is that this creates a unique situation for Muslim and Arab-Americans. Even
in 1997, more than any other race, ethnic, or religious group, Arab and Muslim
Americans faced active and pejorative racism, rather than inactive and subtle issues
with ‘white privilege’ or ignorance.122 This is a trend which was only worsened by the
events of September 11th, 2001. The report goes on to discuss the future of race in
America rather optimistically in terms of multiculturalism; a future in which, by 2050, only
53 percent of Americans would be white.123 Given this statistic, Was America ready for
this eventuality? This also ties into the ideas of multiculturalism. With the report that
America would only become more diverse in the coming decades, it is also implied that
the issues surrounding race would no longer be localized to white and black Americans.
It was of the opinion of the writers that the United States had not yet risen to that
challenge, and needed to address the problems quickly. Their suggestions were meant
to change America for the better, but were they heeded in a post September 11th United
States?
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Before discussing whether the issues of race were addressed, it is important to
discuss what the writers of the Clinton Initiative pointed to as the biggest issues. The
first big issue the writers saw was the simplistic classification of race in America. The
issues with this are varied, but they main problems come down to the fact that they are
generally arbitrary, they get in the way of mutual understanding, and they often
mischaracterize people.124 These issues have always been particularly poignant when
discussing broad groups such as Arab-Americans and Muslim Americans. The waters
become very muddied when people focus on larger group distinctions and the
differences between them. Healthy discussion of race is truly hard when
characterizations and stereotypes are imprinted on groups.125 This idea only worsened
for Arab-Americans after September 11th. Another important issue which the authors
saw was regarding the addition of vast numbers of new ethnic groups to the American
landscape. Most research on race relations in America prior to the twenty-first century
was regarding the systemic racism against black Americans by white. The report points
specifically to the “Kerner Commission” 30 years prior. 126 While obviously a vital
discussion to continue to have, it was important for the writers that discussions of other
ethnic groups emerge as well. However, just prior to September 11th, important
developments were occurring in regards to patriotism, xenophobia, and Arab and
Muslim American Identity.
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In the few years prior to 2001, a few very distinct forms of patriotism emerged in
the United States. The three main forms which emerged in the post-Cold War nineties,
and which have seen somewhat of a renaissance in recent years, are symbolic,
environmental and iconoclastic. (There were a few others, but they were not polled as
being very popular).127 Symbolic patriotism appears to be the most nationalistic, where
the patriot is one who views the most important aspects of the country as being its
symbols; flags, colors, etcetera. Environmental patriots generally believe in the natural
wonders of the country. This means that all who degrade said land with
overdevelopment are not patriotic. Finally, iconoclastic patriots are those who believe
that the spirit of a nation belong in its principals, such as those laid out in the
constitution.128 This is the patriotism most associated with the idea of ‘Civic Nationalism’
mentioned in chapter one of this thesis. It is the argument of the next chapter that
Americans went from being more iconoclastically patriotic in the late 1990s to more
symbolic in the time after September 11th, having regressed in this regard after 2001.
However, patriotism was not the only American ideal that was arguably at a positive
point during the late 1990s. The country had become a tenably post-National state,
where ethnicity and culture did not halter a citizen’s ability to identify as an American.
The post-nationalist America which emerged in the 1990s was one of
multiculturalism and outward policy. However, this did not mean that the this concept did
not contain any contradictions. Essentially, while breaking down nationalism and
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integrating cultures in the United States during the 1990s was certainly an admirable
goal, it still placed America at the forefront of the world stage. Essentially, in a postnational world, the United States had the ability and justification to export its values of
diversity across the world.129 This is essentially promoting a sort of American
exceptionalism which had been seen before, except with different concepts such as
democracy. In this image, the United States is unique amongst nations, absent of
cultural struggles. Unfortunately, this was not truly the case.130 Despite this glaring
contradiction, this new Americanism was certainly a change from the traditional ideals of
jingoism and spreading vague ideas of capitalism and democracy. This was best
exemplified by the humanitarian foreign intervention largely exercised by the Clinton
administration in Somalia and Kosovo. Despite this, after 2001, America began
exporting the previously civilizing ideals it had before (which will be discussed in more
detail later). In addition to American multiculturalism developing in the decades before
2001, specific consciousnesses of cultures were also emerging. Most notably, ArabAmericans were gaining a very significant foothold in American life.
Just prior to September 11th, a genuine Arab American identity was emerging. As
with most other ethnicities in the history of the 20th Century United States, Arab
consciousness in the country was being formed around a political cause. The cause
which Arab Americans rallied around the the question of Israel, the real genesis of which
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was arguably the Six-Day War in 1967.131 Prior to this conflict, Arab-Americans had
largely been trying to assimilate and fit into society. However, through this conflict and
the subsequent American support for Israel, Arabs in the United States gained a certain
level of identity which made their experiences in the country more unique. By the 1990s,
many Arab-Americans and scholars had recognized that they had “made a
breakthrough.”132 This was celebrated through celebrations of Arab culture. Finally, it
seemed, Arab-American children were beginning to be proud to identify as such in a
way which differentiated them from other Americans.133 This meant that not only were
they a unique group in the American melting pot, but they could be politically active
without being accused of being unpatriotic. In addition to the cultural and political
consciousness being achieved by Arab Americans in the 1990s, major scholarship was
also beginning to be dedicated to them, only to be halted by September 11th.
Just prior to September 11th, 2001, Arab Americans were finally receiving the
scholarship they deserved. As mentioned, after the Arab-Israeli conflict began in
earnest, Arab-Americans became quite politically active. In addition to allowing them to
assert their cultural uniqueness, this activism also finally began paying dividends in
terms of serious scholarship in the late 1990s.134 While this can arguably be traced, at
least in part, to more serious acts of violence such as the 1993 World Trade Center
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Bombing, it can also be heavily traced to an realization of inherent connection with other
minorities in the country. Many people began to realize that the orientalism which Arabs
faced, mainly the sentimentalized image of Arab and Muslim culture, similarly set them
back in society to how other groups had been.135 (This is not to say that the actual
actions of white Americans towards Arabs was close to the brutality of institutions such
as slavery, only that they were being persecuted in way which resembled some people’s
ignorance of the lasting effects of slavery on African American’s social standing in the
country). Because of this demand for recognition, prior to 2001, Arabs were arguably
about to become a political force in the country. However, after September 11th, it was
the politicians and regular Americans who in turn began to demand what Arabs stood for
in the country.136 In this way, while Arab-Americans were arguably about to escape the
periphery of society in the 1990s, they were forced right into the middle of it after
September 11th, and not in a positive way.
The suggested solutions to issues with American race relations contained in the
“Clinton Initiative on Race” are important to discuss as they show the progress the
country was ready to make just prior to September 11th, and how much the current
situation is a deviation from the projected course. It has taken the United States nearly
two decades to finally attempt to reassess these ideas, and this is a slow process at
that. The first suggestion is simply an enforcement of Civil Rights laws, as many
Americans faced punishable and preventable discrimination. The reason this
enforcement was often blocked, in the opinions of the authors, came down to a mixture

135

Salaita, “Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism,” in College Literature, 165.

136

Salaita, “Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism,” in College Literature, 149.

55

of lack of funding and data.137 (Unfortunately, this trend only worsened after 2001).
Another solution suggested by the authors of the report was simple education on race
and race relations. All Americans should understand the all encompassing nature of the
values of the country, but were often stifled in their education of this early in life. When
discrimination and stereotypes are taught early on in children, they become incredibly
hard to dispel later on. This becomes even worse when these stereotypes are ignored,
or even encouraged by adults.138 This encouragement could easily come from faulty
patriotism. The final major solution suggested by the authors surround the relationship
between minorities and law enforcement and authority figures. For society to be equal
and effective, everybody must be able to trust the justice of the United States, but often
cannot. Profiling and systemic issues with incarceration contribute to the antagonism
between peoples.139 The most visible example of this today and at the time of the
report’s authoring was the intrinsic racism of the American justice system towards
blacks and latinos. This unfortunately remains a dire issue in 2018. In the same way
today, Arab-Americans need to be able to trust the government, but often cannot.
Essentially, the ‘Clinton Initiative on Race’ provided for a candid but hopeful exploration
into the future of race relations in America.
The period from the Vietnam Era to the 1990s saw the rise and fall of both
xenophobia and symbolic patriotism. Just prior to 2001, the Clinton administration
arguably saw the emergence of a positive form of patriotism which dispelled racism and
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encouraged multiculturalism. However, despite the trajectory of the nation being quite
positive in the developing post-nationalist America, September 11th made the country
veer off path, and towards racism and suspicion.
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Chapter Three:
Just Prior to September 11th, patriotism and Arab and Muslim-American identity
in the United States was reaching a healthy point, but the tragedy in New York and
Washington D.C. completely shattered this. Prior to 2001, patriotism in the United
States had emerged from the presidencies of Reagan, Bush Sr., and Clinton as an
arguably positive force, despite years of back and forth, and despite the two Republican
presidents’ intentions to make it more nationalistic. While different people still had
differing interpretations of the idea, it was generally forcing positive introspection. This is
similar to the lives of Arab-Americans, who likewise were forming an important identity
in the country. However, September 11th contained two additional casualties when the
towers fell. In the immediate aftermath, very jingoistic and nationalistic opinions were
voiced regarding the United State’s role in the world as a benevolent leader, as well as
Arabs’ and Muslims’ role in the country, respectively. Essentially American patriotism
changed almost fundamentally. In the following months and years, distinct actions were
made which reenforced these new ideas, and in turn provided for extremely severe
appropriations of rights and justice. In addition to white America’s views changing, ArabAmericans had to adapt to the new social order, and are continuing to do so today.
Indeed, September 11th completely devastated the emerging positive patriotism and
multiculturalism which had taken America so long to forge.
On September 11th, 2001, the United States and the world was changed in a
way that will alter them for generations to come. Arguably the most effected Americans
in the immediate aftermath, other than families of the victims and New Yorkers, were
Arab and Muslim Americans. This was because these Americans felt not only all the
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pain, grief, sadness, and anger which all other citizens felt from such a heinous act, but
also fear and betrayal. Arab and Muslim Americans were in fear of reprisals for being
the same ethnicity and religion as the attackers, and betrayal from both those of their
own religion and by those Americans who participated in the hate crimes which
inevitably did come. 140 Reported on October 6th, 2001, The New York Times claimed
that “Perhaps hundreds of hate crimes have been directed at Middle Easterners,
Muslims and Sikhs throughout the country since Sept. 11, crimes ranging form
vandalism to verbal assaults to the murder of a Sikh restaurant owner in Arizona
mistaken for an Arab.” 141 It must be remembered that around one percent of the victims
of the attacks were Muslim, which was also around the percentage of Americans who
were Muslim total.142 Because of this, it was absolutely just for Muslim Americans to feel
the same outrage as other citizens, if it had not been just before. In addition to this, it
was also justifiable that Arab and Muslim Americans asked for calm amongst their fellow
Americans.143 Sadly, in the following months, this was not heeded.
In the months following September 11th, Americans found it difficult to temper
their feelings. Some of the most spirited and violent hate crimes came in the first three
months after the tragedy, and it was not only Arabs and Muslims who bore the brunt of
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this. All people with brown skin color were victimized by hate and violence. On March
11th, 2002 the New York Times reported that “attacks on Asian-Americans, particularly
Pakistani and Indian Immigrants, increased greatly in the United States in the weeks
after Sept. 11…”144 Even some groups who claimed to be defending their own faith,
such as the Jewish Defense League, took part.145 Few Americans were exempt from
this hate, which also bled into a denial of civil rights. In the short time after 9/11, Arab
Americans began being denied the basic entitlements of citizens, including but not
limited to, the ability to become pilots, profiling at airports, color coding for danger on
airplanes, and a general denial of service by businesses. 146 Muslims were feeling what
The New York Times reported on April 25th, 2002, as “quiet but persistent discrimination
against them in their everyday social transactions.”147 Regardless of what a person or
company believes to be justice for America, these were transparent denials of civil
rights. Unfortunately, this did not matter at the time, and these slights were permitted to
occur. In addition to general citizens, more public figures also took part in the assault
and defense of Arab-Americans.
September 11th was an attack on all of America, its supposed ideals and its
identity, no matter what some of those Americans think of them. Because of this, every
American citizen had the right to react to it. The issue with this was, when many of
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America’s ideals are contradictory, depending on the citizen asked, there will be
countless different reactions. To wit, there were countless different types of hate which
many felt, and these are worth discussing. Essentially, xenophobia in the United States
took a few different forms following September 11th. Exclusive xenophobia is where
Americans believe that by dint of being different, Arabs and Muslims did not even exist
in the imagined community. Possessive xenophobia is where a person believes that the
outsider does not exist in the community, and is a subsequent drain on it. Finally, toxic
xenophobia is where the American believes that the Arab or Muslim American does not
exist in the community, and that they are in fact trying to undermine it.148 While the
former two are often more unthinking, or at least benign enough to not cause panic, the
latter is extremely characteristic of the virulent hatred which Arab and Muslim Americans
felt. For example, the beliefs that the building of a Mosque or wearing of a Hijab are
antiAmerican are, by definition, toxic xenophobia. Because some believed these were
threats to American freedom is a hatred which is extremely characteristic of
Islamophobia.149 It was through nationalist feelings that toxic xenophobia emerged in
the United States.
Like with xenophobia, there are different forms of nationalism which emerged
following September 11th. The first, more benign type is a type of everyday nationalism.
This sentiment is taught early in life in schools with the pledge of allegiance. It is
because of this nationalism that younger Muslim and Arab children become
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marginalized for being different. Additionally, because of the more extreme forms of
nationalism, this is often overlooked.150 This more extreme nationalism is when
somebody uses patriotic sentiment to justify the civil rights violations against Arabs and
Muslims in the United State.151 Both of these nationalisms feed on a certain imagined
community, where the nation is never complete, but needs constant readdressing to
decide who is to be excluded. In America, Muslims and Arabs have continually been
excluded. A ban on mosques or a hijab is an extension of the orientalism which has
characterized the United State’s relationship with its Muslim and Arab citizens. As with
the perceived colonial superiority of the past, western religious, moral and democratic
superiority characterize American views on Muslims and Arabs. The main difference
between now and then is that the groups are vilified as violent rather than
romanticized.152 This plays directly into the role of patriotism in Islamophobia, given how
dependent American patriotism became on religion and democracy, especially after
September 11th.
Religious leaders, pundits, and politicians all quickly emerged following
September 11th to join in the discussion on what was to be done about Arabs and
Muslims in the United States. Sadly, but unsurprisingly, much of the discourse was very
negative and in many cases was bordering on, or even crossing into, hate speech.
Many religious leaders were very vocal in denouncing Islam as a rejection of American
values. In connecting America and patriotism with Christian traditionalism, many
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religious leaders set Muslims apart from other Americans.153 Politicians and pundits
were arguably more virulent in their hatred, but many similarly relied on evoking the
Judeo-Christian values so often associated with America and its allies. In 2002, House
Majority Leader Dick Armey made headlines by calling for Israel to expel all Palestinians
from the West Bank. While this may not inherently be violent, it would still be an ethnic
cleansing of the region.154 This abhorrent comment can be seen as an effort by Armey
to pursue closer relations with Israel by espousing American hate against Arabs. Pundit
Ann Coulter arguably adopted worse positions, but positions which were much more in
line with Christian American values nonetheless. She called for America to enter Muslim
countries and convert them to Christianity by force.155 While this espousal for a new
crusade was on its face negating traditional ideals of patriotism, and even those
developed in the 1990s, they were reflective of what many Americans believed. In this
way, it can be argued that this was the reemergence of a jingoistic patriotism not seen
since years previously. Some, however, sought to support their fellow Americans.
On September 28th, 2001, The New York Times reported that “American Muslims
and Arab groups have enlisted government officials, Islamic Scholars and even [the]
teenage pop star [Mandy Moore] to combat what many fear could be a rising tide of
harassment of hate.”156 However, this support was often seen as unpatriotic in turn, or
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elitist and out of touch with the views of common Americans.157 While this shows that
some tried to resist this in favor of a more inclusive national feeling, they were not very
successful, and Arab and Muslim Americans had to ask themselves whether they could
share in the collective American identity.
September 11th, like no other event before it, challenged the hegemony of the
United States. The main responses to this were the seizure of civil rights under the
guise of patriotism and protecting Americans, and war in the Mid-East and SouthCentral Asia.158 The prevailing mentality of the country considered opposition to either of
the measures a rejection of what the county stood for. The mentality was that, ‘if the
terrorists hate everything America stands for, and you disapprove of some of what it
stands for, then you are on par with the enemy’.159 The error with this idea is that
America is a land of contradictions, and one can not possibly approve of all aspects of
it. Regardless, for the first time since 1812, the war was on American mainland shores,
which meant patriotism looked inward; for the first time in almost 200 years, Americans
felt what other countries feel during war. This meant that the United States equated
security with nationalism, and the return to simplistic peace with traditional
Americanism.160 This return to patriotic rhetoric not seen since Bush Sr. was marked by
a massive change in what was being reported in regards to both foreign and domestic
issues. At the time, controversial opinions were being rejected by more popular and
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palatable ones inside of the country. When this happens, the rest of the world views a
much different story the the United States was seeing.161 The further response to the
attacks was the emergence of a largely binary system of good versus evil.
After September 11th, the rhetoric of the United States resembled that of the
early Cold War. With the sole military superpower on the planet suddenly becoming a
victim, a system emerged which viewed good and evil as absolutes. In this system,
America represented a certain type purity in the world, while terrorists and those who
resembled them representing an the absolute malice.162 This was similar to how
Communists were seen around the 1950s. Further than this, the more Americans have
rallied around the symbolism of America, the more they worry about somebody
disrupting them.163 Given the ethnic nature of much or this insularism, the people who
would be suspected of disrupting the symbols would be those who did not resemble
these traditional national values. While the obvious victims of this are Arab and Muslim
Americans, it can arguably lead to more xenophobia against any minority. Overall,
September 11th ushered in a new era for American history on both a personal and
national level.
As well as the ‘good verses evil’ system which emerged, a binary system also
emerged which claimed that America was the only legitimate state actor in the War on
Terror. This was largely reflective of the trend of American policy of the time, where the
country was taught to dig in and defend against an attack from all sides. Essentially, this
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meant that while the United States represented state validity and law, its enemies were
characterized by an anarchical chaos.164 In this system displays of patriotic fervor
become absolutely vital, and borders become the only protection from disorder. In this
way, despite the fact that the hijackers entered the country legally, Americans espouse a
sense of ‘digging in’ and protecting the country from the chaos brought in from
abroad.165 In addition to being a clear precursor to general xenophobia, it is also a
fundamental change in the way American’s relationship to the rest of world is viewed
domestically. In the aftermath of September 11th, maps become three dimensional, with
cultures and social groups becoming as important as other nation’s borders. It then
becomes the goal of America to ensure that this disintegration of boundaries does not
occur domestically as well.166 In this way, ‘digging in’ paradoxically has two effects: It
creates an ‘us verses them’ mentality which manifests itself as state patriotism and
reassurance of borders, while simultaneously deconstructing the concept of a state in
general by creating actors who subvert and actors who uphold the nation on the
inside.167 In America, this had sweeping effects.
The threat of terroristic borderlessness became much more important in the
minds of Americans than understanding nations and nationhood in the aftermath of
September 11th. This mentality lead to an intrinsic dependence on the common
iconography of America. Because of this, states which defended and bound their
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borders with both physical and symbolic nationalism were perceived as more resilient
than those which did not.168 When the territoriality of a state becomes more imperative
to its citizens than accepting multiculturalism, minority cultures suffer. A poignant
example of this is a discussion of the nationalities of those inside the Twin Towers.
While it is certainly positive in many ways to say that, ‘all were American citizens,
regardless of ethnicity or race’, it can also lead to a misleading picture of the event.
When patriotism revolves around a white, Christian narrative, saying ‘all were American’
contributes to the idea of white, Christian victimization. Because of this, it becomes
difficult to imagine any other race or religion being a victim. This is a part of the reason
why, when sadness finally gives way to anger, all Arabs and Muslims are attacked being
unAmerican.169 All these developments in the patriotic consciousness had lasting
repercussions on the nation, both in terms of creating a culture of white, Christian
insularism, and in driving the actions of the nation both domestically and in foreign
policy.
The immediate governmental and military reactions to September 11th were
largely reflective of national attitudes. In the end, it was not Bush Sr. who was president
when Vietnam Syndrome ended in the Arabian Desert, but rather, his son, when it
ended in New York and Washington D.C. All of the emotional and intellectual arguments
which had prevented the Presidents of the previous few decades from becoming
embroiled abroad were forgotten, and patriotism became fashionable again. In this post
September 11th time a country previously weary of their government was calling for
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vengeance and justice.170 Congress reflected this sentiment when they gave George W.
Bush a ‘blank check’ in pursuit of doing so. More consequential than this, however, was
that the American people were calling for intervention in South-Central Asia and the
Middle East. Despite this, it should be said, some people were keeping a more level
head and recalled that Afghanistan was a country which had defeated great powers
before, just like Vietnam. However, this naysaying only provided fuel for Republicans
who, when we became bogged down in the country in October, 2001, blamed the
dissent.171 In this way, Vietnam Syndrome was reinvigorated and politicians were again
claiming dissent to be unpatriotic. Given that the country is still embroiled in the area in
2018, it seems that the patriotic sentiment from the Republicans prevailed.
It was not long at all after September 11th that America was at war in
Afghanistan. Despite initial setbacks, the initial campaign was quite successful. Like the
success of Operation Dessert Storm in 1991, the toppling of the Taliban was proof
enough for Americans that war worked again. In this way, the dreaded Vietnam
Syndrome seemed to be dead. In addition to this, the early stages of the war seemingly
proved that ground warfare could be won with few American casualties. These early
successes reinvigorated Americans and made them believe that the unmitigated
quagmires of the past were over.172 The fact that the government was able to convince
the people of this so early on led to further developments in the war on terror. Soon, the
American public was completely agreeable to intervention against terrorist or terrorist
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sponsoring states. Polls from 2002 show that people supported intervention in Iraq, Iran,
and even against Islamic insurgents in the Philippines.173 This was much hawkish than
the nonaggression of the late 1990s, and was mainly spurred on by a reinvigorated
jingoistic patriotism. This also had effects on the American consciousness regarding its
past.
The reason for, and consequence of, the aggressive patriotism was the same
toxic revisionism which occurred under Reagan. Again, people looked back at
quagmires such as Vietnam with rose tinted glasses. This revisionism claimed that it
was not possible for the United States to be so bogged down when it had the support of
all citizens. 174 This mentality had major consequences for American foreign policy, with
Bush believing that he could solve all of the issues in the Middle East which had been
plaguing the free, democratic, and, whether he would admit it or not, Christian world.
This was a step further than the Invasion of Afghanistan, which was at least given some
reason by the Taliban harboring Bin Laden. After the Iraq war began, it was clear that
the containment policy of the Cold War was gone, because in the new millennia,
preemptive wars were the only way America could win. Essentially, Donald Rumsfeld
and Dick Cheney likely more than the President himself, were dismantling the Powell
Doctrine, ironically while Powell was Secretary of State.175 In an effort to provide a final
closure to the Vietnam Syndrome, the Bush Administration made ousting Saddam
Hussein the center of their foreign policy goals. Initially, it worked, with the fall of
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Baghdad occurring only around a month after the start of the invasion. Akin the early
successes in Afghanistan, the Invasion of Iraq showed to the American people that the
country was strong again, and that military action was a viable first choice in foreign
policy.176 However, as the next decade and a half of war has proved, quagmires
comparable to Vietnam were still entirely possible. The revisionist based domestic
actions were similarly harmful.
Many citizens expressed inclusive opinions towards Arab and Muslim Americans
in the aftermath of September 11th, including good will from politicians. In late
September, 2001, John McCain claimed that “Violence or discrimination against Arab
and Muslim Americans is a betrayal of everything America stands for.”177 However, the
actions of the United States government and the general response was much more
negative and reflected a desire for a return to normalcy. As stated, the national rhetoric
response to the tragedy was one of increased patriotism, reflected in speeches of
George Bush, the defense of the bombing of Afghanistan, and a rise in cultural comforts
such as Norman Rockwell paintings.178 However, this rise in American traditionalism
was not as much a rediscovery of conservatism as it was a “flag-shrouded anxiety”.179
These types of cultural assurances were representative of the anxiety induced
patriotism, which asserted that, while American values are timeless, they were in
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trouble. In this way patriotism represented a return to normalcy.180 The government
largely capitalized on this anxiety to assert the goals of the country, which made what
would have once seemed like a domestic rejection of rights and justice much more
palatable.
The United States following September 11th was essentially an uncovered nerve;
quick to react and extreme in its retaliation. The main example of this was the PATRIOT
Act, which was announced under the guise of protecting American values. In actuality,
the act was the first step aimed at limiting American civil liberties.181 The first victims of
this, were Arab and Muslim Americans, who became much more limited in expressing
political opinions, especially regarding Palestine. If they did, they could be accused of
anti-Americanism and even anti-Semitism, and targeted.182 However, the PATRIOT Act
and other actions of the United States government were mainly efforts to reenforce the
strong border rhetoric, which stemmed from an idea of protecting American values.
The post September 11th era made the effort to strengthen American borders,
and make sure enemies could not longer get in, essential. This mainly entailed
enhanced border security, such as with the PATRIOT Act, the Visa Entry Act and the
tracking of foreign students. However, it also entailed reassessing the legitimately of
foreign groups’ claims, and the necessity to be rid of them at any means necessary.183
In seeking to protect American democracy, and humanity as a whole, the United States
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was shrewdly denying the other’s claims to humanity.184 In doing so, it set a dangerous
precedent. While claiming Al-Qaeda operatives and the hijackers are state actors (or
even have humanity) is not exactly correct either, delegitimizing their operations to such
an extent allows for any recourse, no matter how dangerous or inhumane in turn. This
rhetoric is why dangerous carpet bombing operations can occur in Afghanistan, and why
people can be held indefinitely without trial in Guantanamo Bay.185 Patriotic ideals are
the main reason acts such as military tribunals for suspected terrorists on ships at sea
could garner what The New York Times conceded was “broad public support”.186 By
patriotically protecting American values, the government was able to justify many
actions, including those which harmed civilians or were blatant human rights violations.
Inside the United States as well, these ideas led to massive civil rights violations inside
the United States.
When the PATRIOT Act was enacted in late October, 2001, it dampened all hope
of a healthy relationship with Arab and Muslim Americans. Like with many other groups,
the act had broad support in the Arab American community, who also saw it as a viable
way to protect the country. However, it soon became clear that the Act was a major
violation of Constitutional rights brought about by fear and anxiety. 187 More than this, the
PATRIOT Act unjustly but unsurprisingly targeted Arab and Muslim Americans. With the
description of all Al-Qaeda and Taliban Operatives as non-state actors, the United
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States allowed for the creation of largely mythical ‘domestic terrorists’ who, acting as a
fifth column, theoretically endeavored to disrupt America and undermined its values. It
was because of this that, between 2001 and 2004 alone, over 1000 Arab men were
detained by the FBI, with some held indefinitely, and others being quietly deported.188
Despite acts such as the Oklahoma City Bombing being carried out in the name of new
patriotism, these groups do not face targeting as often. The only discernible reasoning
for this discrepancy that can be described is that the Islamic Terrorists arguably provide
support for a foreign enemy. However, is there any real difference between the groups
other than the fact that one’s goals are American and Christian based, and one’s is
foreign and Islamic.189 Both can do the same harm domestically, but only one is
targeted in such a way. Additionally, despite there being no justification for the murder of
almost 3000 people, for the United States to deny any responsibility in creating either
group through abandoning the Mujahideen after the Soviet-Afghan War and supporting
Israel is foolish and detrimental to any effort to defeat them.190 The encroachments
continue from here, growing from civil to human rights violations.
The well publicized actions in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib highlight some
of the worst human rights violations against detainees, but they were by no means the
only ones. In the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, it has been alleged that
similar torture has occurred. On April 3th, 2002, The New York Times reported that
“dozens of Muslim men have been held in virtual secrecy after their arrests,” and that
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they “Civil Rights groups have complained that many detainees were not allowed to
contact family members or lawyers after their arrests and that their haven been held
under especially harsh conditions for people charged only with minor immigration
violations.”191 Additionally, in the same article, it was reported that a judge had to
intervene to assure the trials were open to the public, showing clear intentions of other
authorities to clandestinely violate the rights of prisoners through acts such as private
trials. Further, in this time, while some police refused to comply, as many as 18,000 men
were brought in for questioning across the United States, with the definition of
criminality expanding heavily.192 Additionally, because of this new lax definition of
justice, search and seizures were becoming commonplace, where homes could be
entered and possessions searched.193 With the FBI monitoring small businesses and all
of the rights violations mentioned above, by 2002, Arab and Muslim Americans began to
realize that they were being targeted indiscriminately by these acts. The main question
to be asked of this is; How should America respond with these issues of
marginalization? Essentially, it is a question of scholarship on the issues, specifically by
Arab-Americans.
Only just prior to September 11th, scholarship on Arab and Muslim Americans
was finally emerging. However, after, they were shot from the periphery of society to the
very center. Because of this, it became more important for Arabs and Muslims to
integrate into American society and history (not necessarily assimilate, but cultivate their
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own hyphenated American identity), but was simultaneously more difficult to do so. In
essence, it was vital for Arab and Muslim Americans to form a political identity, but could
not for risk of being labeled unpatriotic.194 Because of this, it is vital that more Arab and
Muslim scholarship emerge, especially by Arab and Muslim Americans, and that it be
more accepted. This serves the dual purpose of furthering knowledge on these
important Americans, while also helping them become more accepted in the country.
This will only come when Americans accept the dissent against the actions of the
country. However, there are very challenging issues in this regard.
Unlike any other groups in the United States following September 11th, Arab and
Muslim Americans were forced to think about their cultural allegiances. This was not
because Arabs and Muslims were in any way against America, only that they were now
on the periphery of society and had to decide whether they wanted to remain culturally
distinct. The reason these groups of people were forced to tread lightly was that an
“imperative patriotism” was dictating that all dissent was unpatriotic.195 The impression
of conformity was meant to generally aid the legitimacy of national efforts abroad and
domestically. Essentially, the question of the day was, ‘Are you with America and God,
or your own religion and culture?’. Along with being inherently xenophobic, this question
is specifically Islamophobic. In declaring a divine interest in American interests,
patriotism took on the traditional American values of Christianity.196 Essentially, in using
this question to quell any dissent, the United States essentially had the ability to claim
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Christian civilization as a right to fix problems overseas without any general protest
domestically. In this way, it was an ‘imperative patriotism’, as it became essential that
racism be used to further goals abroad.197 In the time following September 11th,
Imperative patriotism further proved to be inherently connected to xenophobia.
In saying, ‘If you do not like it’, leave, imperative Patriotism directly lends itself to
xenophobia. The reason it is, is that assumes the United States has a largely fixed
identity, and any dissent, culturally, religiously, politically, or otherwise, forfeits one’s
claim to that identity. This only increased after September 11th, where the United
States, emerged as having one way of life, which was iconographically patriotic, white,
christian, and apolitical.198 However, a lack of addressing previous issues leads to
further xenophobic rhetoric. For example, the lack of white American addressing of
slavery has had a direct impact on racism in the modern United States. The same goes
for September 11th and Arab and Muslim Americans. In never truly addressing its
issues with orientalism prior to 2001, America set itself up for xenophobia. Additionally,
in not addressing the various issues with patriotism, America ignores the toxic
expressions of racism which come from using it as an excuse.199 This does not go for
Arab and Muslim Americas alone, either, as the recent NFL protests have shown that
the increasingly divisive patriotism has led to increasingly divided race relations.
For patriotism to regain any semblance of usefulness or positivity, it must
reemerge as it existed prior to September 11th, but after the administration of George
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H.W. Bush. Historically, in the 21st century, Patriotism has had a direct role in informing
islamophobia in the United States. In the immediate aftermath of September 11th, the
American people, as a result of trying to understand what had happened, were very
divisive in their reactions to the tragedy. However, quickly, a binary system of good and
evil quickly emerged, where ethnic identity and patriotism became an important deciding
factor. This, plus the idea of terrorists as illegitimate humans or state actors, meant that
these distinct cultures tended to be regarded as illegitimate as well. The governmental
response to September 11th was equally harmful. In using patriotic rhetoric to assert the
goals of the state and further justify its actions, acts such as the PATRIOT Act and the
undoubtably superfluous and damaging Iraq War can occur. Patriotism can be a positive
aspect of American culture, notably when its an all including, iconoclastic, willing to
address its own faults, and healing. Essentially, if patriotism is aimed at upholding the
ideals of justice, as with ‘civic nationalism’, it can be a positive. However, the aftermath
of September 11th has proven it to be a largely symbolic and even toxic ideal which
leads itself, whether directly or indirectly, consciously or subconsciously, to both
xenophobic and repressive rhetorics.
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